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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP INTELLIGENCE REPORT

COUNTRY China

DATE

SUBJECT Political Information: General MA Chan-shan's
Interview with the Generalissimo

INFO. See below

DIST. 27 April 1947

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SUPPLEMENT

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1. Until early December 1946, General MA Chan-shan was still optimistic about the possibility of his getting an acceptable appointment (previously reported) from the Central Government which would allow him to proceed to Manchuria and restore order to whatever portion of the Northeast CHIANG Kai-shek saw fit to assign to him. However, on about 10 December he received a telegram from CH'EN Ch'eng concerning MA's own special troops, which MA feels were primarily responsible for holding Tatum (112-14, 40-06) against the Chinese Communists in the Fall of 1946. These troops, which have traditionally belonged to MA for many years are loyal to him and consider him "their" general just as he considers them "his" troops. They were about 20,000 men organized into the two divisions of the "Northeast Advance Corps", which were generally considered (certainly by MA and his followers) to be the units which would accompany MA in his expected return to Manchuria to organize his irregular forces (previously reported). CH'EN's telegram informed MA that his two divisions were to be reorganized into two cavalry brigades and would be turned over to FU Tso-yi. (The former division commanders would still command the brigades.) MA was surprised and angered at the unexpected move, and decided to go to Nanking immediately.

2. On 19 December MA flew to Nanking, registered at the Generalissimo's Headquarters, and requested an interview with CHIANG Kai-shek. CHIANG at first refused to see MA, but after five days of silence and upon a more insistent request by MA, he gave MA an audience on the sixth day. MA was greeted without cordiality, and he could tell by CHIANG's "extremely unpleasant" look that he was not welcome. CHIANG immediately told MA that he should have come earlier and then asked why MA had not gone back to Manchuria. MA replied that if CHIANG referred to MA's appointment to be a deputy of TU Yu-ming, the appointment was not satisfactory and that he did not feel that as one of the many deputies of TU that he could work effectively. MA then said that he was not concerned about the size of a territory assigned to him, but that he wanted to be fully responsible for what occurred there; he then requested that the Generalissimo assign him even a very small portion of the Northeast, an area where freedom of action and full responsibility for that action would be MA's, with responsibility not to TU but to Nanking. CHIANG did not reply to this. Then MA asked CHIANG what his responsibilities would be as a deputy. MA said he wanted to be assigned definite work for which he could be fully responsible, as he had a good name in Manchuria, and that he did not want to lose it, that he must know what his mission would be, what he could tell his followers he was supposed to do. CHIANG then advised MA to go to Mukden and take

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his instructions from General HSIUNG Shih-hui, Chairman of the President's Headquarters for the Northeast. MA was indignant at this complete and abrupt refusal of CHIANG to talk on any basis except that of MA's subordination to the Kuomintang generals. He immediately left without further discussion.

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3. After the interview with CHIANG, MA talked with CH'EN Ch'eng. CH'EN said that MA had come too late, that if MA had come three months earlier, there might have been something for him to do. MA felt that he was insulted by the implication that he was a "job-seeker".
4. After his conference with the Nationalist Chief of Staff, MA learned from a friend of his who had talked to one of CH'EN's close associates, of remarks which CH'EN had made after talking to MA. CH'EN had said that MA was too old and too inexperienced in modern warfare; that MA was of little value; that it was better to use a Whangpoa Military Academy man who was trained in modern military techniques.
5. After a total of ten days in Nanking, MA, angry, disgusted, and disappointed, went to Shanghai where he spent several days before he returned by sea to Tientsin and thence to Peiping, passing through Tientsin on 22 January. He feels that his mission to Nanking and his previous attempts to cooperate with the Central Government have been complete failures and sees no possibility of serving the Central Government as it exists at present.

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